So … do we think the AFU were being smart in Kharkov at the same time they were being foolish in Kherson? Or is the Kherson action intelligible as a feint or something?
Good question. I don't think Kherson was a diversion. I think Kherson was identified as an attractive point to test for other reasons. Namely that it is across the Dnieper.
I wasn’t referring to the objective, but to the reports of the failure of the AFU push in that area, even as they made the big advance to near Kupyansk.
My misunderstanding: I thought you meant the Ukrainians conceived the Kherson attack as a feint, before the main one launched towards Kupiansk. I listed the reasons to think it may have been legit.
Well, just to be clear, I *was* suggesting that possibility: that rather than the failure it appears to be, the push in Kherson was a feint or diversion to help the real objective in Kharkov. But it was just a question and, as Marko says, probably not the case. Reality, especially in war, has no obligation to be neat and easy to grasp.
There was speculation Kremlin planned to annex Lugansk and Donetsk making it Russian soil which would allow it to use conscripts there without having to proclaim the state of war, but inability to take Donetsk put a wrench in that.
«Kremlin planned to annex Lugansk and Donetsk making it Russian soil which would allow it to use conscripts there without having to proclaim the state of war»
There is a bit of a myth that this is war from the Russian Federation against Ukraine, but it is actually a counter-attack by the DPR and LNR (helped by a small RF allied force) against the war of aggression started by the ukrainian government in 9 may 2014. The DPR and LNR already have conscription...
The late Romans had a system of mobile central reserves behind frontier lines which were held only by lightly armed garrisons. There was one such Reserve in Gallia Belgica, one in what we call now Burgundy, a beefy one watching the Danube near Sirmium the current Belgrade, others in modern Bulgaria, Syria and Jordan. These defence nuclei, mostly composed of cavalry, would fall upon any invader who managed to breach the frontier, once he's deep enough in friendly territory.
The Ukrainians don't seem serious enough to attack synchronously on multiple points of the front with aim of collapsing it. They only attempt token assaults to look good and get foreign funding. Hence perhaps the ancient Roman defensive stratagem would have benefited the Russians in their current predicament: one mobile reserve group in Kherson, another in Melitopol to watch the Southern front, then one in Belgorod and one in Kupiansk protecting the Karkhov front.
I don't think they would have to watch out for missile attacks aimed at these troop concentrations either, Ukrainians can't strike at long range anymore.
The Roman cavalry as an integrated part of it's total military was pretty much absent after the end of the Republic, and the 'equestrian' class became more of a social guild than a military force. The non-Roman 'auxiliary' horsemen were increasingly turned to; these fought well, under their own leaders, when properly integrated into the high commands battle strategies.
A modern analogy for purposes of your notion would be the Chechens, who have functioned as something of a de facto elite force in Ukraine. That's where your idea breaks down. The Mussies are a 'one off' for Rus. The doctrine of mobile reserves in the modern context requires the sort of 'mid-operational' level freedom of action which the (still standing)Soviet doctrine makes no allowance for. Where a "Guderian/Patton" type of field commander could liaison with his personal and adjoining commands with freedom to exploit opportunities or defend deteriorating sections, the Russian field commander has no such initiative.
Moving(scarce)reserves into battle without a well-coordinated horizontal command structure, especially when it requires long distance movements without a lot of cover, is a good recipe for disaster. I guess the Kyiv debacle would have have taught a Russian high command that practical lesson, had there been any interest in learning and adapting to field conditions - instead of simply rinse n repeat boondoggles which have created the very opportunity UA is seeking to exploit in the east.
Horses eat grass, and grains when working. They move well in small or large groupings and if well cared for by their rider, can(could) travel faster through forbidding territory than the modern petro-monsters can, and don't depend upon rear echelon supply lines as a matter of life or death.
Somebody should have called and told the Russian Army that Ukraine ain't Syria, and that it's time to write up a new doctrine. A lot of dead Russkie paras would still be walking around today, if the message had got through.
A front can 'collapse' on it's own. There may be more to the Ukie tactical manual than you are catching on to so far.
I will gloss over the arrogant and dismissive tone of your message and answer in the merit:
1) I have specified late Romans, never mentioned the Republic or the Equestres for that matter, who originally were the citizens that could afford a horse and connected panoply of arms, then the meaning of the word shifted to indicate the well-heeled.
Contrary to what you wrote, the Roman cavalry had been an increasingly important component of the legions since the crisis of the 3rd century. This is due to the influence of the clashes with the revamped Persian Sasanid Empire to the East, which began at that time to field heavy cavalry (Cataphractes).
With the reforms of Diocletian the new Comitatenses (later Palatini) system was put in place, in which cavalry de facto was increasingly important, Roman or Foederata I didn't specify. This is reflected in the increasing importance of the rank of Magister Equitus at the imperial court. From the most readily source you can access to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comitatenses :
"In the Late Roman Empire the army was divided into two units, the Limitanei and the Comitatenses. The Limitanei would defend against an invasion long enough for the Comitatenses legions to arrive. These Comitatenses legions would be grouped into field armies.[2] This strategy has been described as "defense in depth." "
The above is exactly what I described. The military organisation of the Empire devolved into an increasingly localised one, where the leader or Comes would also be the local landowner who would be invested with the onus of local defense by Rome. With the fall of the Empire, these "Comes" landowners would transition to become the Frankish Counts.
As an aside, the Eastern Roman Empire was even more decisively leaning towards cavalry-dominated armies: the Bucellarii, veterans of Belisarius' campaigns in Spain, Italy, Africa, Mesopotamia were in fact Cataphractes he personally financed (curiously many were Huns).
Again, and I cite it because I find it very interesting, from wikipedia: "Coulston notes that the bucellarii provided the best cavalry in 5th and 6th century Roman armies, and were "recruited from Romans, Persians, Goths, and Huns, amongst others". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucellarii
Essentially, I have read these guys could provide both light and heavy cavalry services. Traditionalist writers from the court of Constantinople in the VI century lamented the decay with respect to the classical era, to whom 'modernists' replied exalting how exceptionally trained these Bucellarii were, with respect to the basic Roman legionary of old. It is reported that Romans amongst Bucellarii ranks could shoot arrows from the saddle exactly like Huns.
2) I didn't equate "Mobile Reserve" with "Elite Corps". Even if I did, it seems to me that a recurrent theme in the current campaign is that every Russian breakthrough (Popasnaya, Pesky) had the Wagner Group involved. I don't know about the Chechens, but I get the impression they are more fizzle than steak.
For the rest, yes, it is notorious the Soviets had a more centralised command, mostly for political reasons though. But then there is the difference between what's written on manuals and the actual practice on the field, and the very existence of this difference is probably what Americans tend not to be able to grasp. Common sense dictates upper brass cannot painstakingly micromanage every little movement of each single company.
On paper they say they do, because that's what's required for them to save appearances.
On the field, where things matter, minute tactical decisions to be made real time are devolved to the highest rank that has on-hands awareness of the current situation his unit is dealing with.
Thinking that the Russians can't grasp what they have put in practice since the battle of Poltava, but instead believing them to be just dull morons who stand still and wait for orders while under enemy fire, means to naively disparaging them.
You undoubtedly were told Communist doctrine was so stiff and antiquate, while the American system is so supple and advanced.
Yet on the field of battle, America was brought from the brink of defeat to a fortuitous stalemate in the Korean War against a bunch of medieval communist peasants, and later had to admit defeat in Vietnam against a similar opponents. Guess who had military aides involved with the Communist sides? The Soviets!
TLDR, in war: U.S.A. - Communists 0-0 0-1, Communists advance to the next round
tdlr? I only see that on the blogs with all the DEATH TO AMERIKA Pootie jock sniffers whose readership loves to talk in code cause it makes em feel more 'cool' man. Thanks for 'comin out!'
I'd written to you basing it on the agreed subject of ''late Roman" and keeping way from the more troublesome topic of your errant "police action." But I can see you are ALREADY melting down in the classic "hedge" manner. No need to proceed.
Yes, the very premise in Internet exchanges, that we all ought to communicate in the framework of American mentality, mildly irritates me.
It's not only the language, but also the style, the morality, the very crassness of replying with arrogance to a complete stranger who was merely sharing a thought on a comment section, the concept that one does not have to answer back because otherwise he'll be told he has been "triggered" and that is supposedly humiliating, etc.
Mostly I manage to keep it in the background, but this irritation can burst to surface in special cases such as your intervention.
What did I do to make you write me back in that tone?... did I maybe sort of intruded into someone else's territory with my parallel to late Roman tactics?
I sincerely hope it was my fault, and not the average way you interact on message boards instead.
You need a mirror badly friend. And a defogger for it as well. The very idea that you imagine this exchange took place in 'the framework of an American mentality' is riotous. But you'll never know.
I got that you are 'irritated.' I used to come up against that vast army of 'irritated' westerners on those outlets pretending that to be opposed to "Anglo-American Imperialism meant taking all one's talking points from "Greater Russia" imperialist outlets. It was boring. They couldn't 'hear' outside their safe space. So I stopped.
The intensity of your discomfort is boring as well. So I will stop here too.
3) Moving a few mechanised regiments (or BTGs as they say now) out of a reserve division stationed in Kupiansk to Balakleya is not a huge logistical undertaking, just an hour drive.
With "A well-coordinated horizontal command structure" I guess you mean the act of telling professional soldiers and tank commanders "Go there, repel the attack and keep us informed of the developments so we can assist with artillery and airforce, while coordinating your efforts with those of other land units. If you communicate with us, we can also plan further defense, a retreat or even a counter-attack depending on how the battle goes real time".
Again, your premises: "Russian regulations are rigidly top-down", (the hidden one) "we Americans are too robotic to deviate from regulations",
hence your conclusions: "Russian units are unresponsive on the field, Russian strategists are so incompetent they cannot conceive the flexibility their ancestors have exhibited throughout history, hence Russians are morons".
Belgorod, Kupiansk, Melitopol, Kherson as I laid out, get all the secondary fronts covered by a mobile reserve defense.
Also, the initial Kiev offensive is not a pertinent comparison. That was attacking, here we are talking defense which means operating inside an area you control and have logistics already in place, while the attacker has none.
4) Horses ARE severely hampered while travelling through "forbidden territory", meaning mountains or marshes.
Anyway I don't see the point of criticising a mobile reserve defense approach from the logistics angle. Yes, tanks guzzle up a lot of fuel, but we are talking the eventuality of defense of an area Russians are in control of, have air superiority over, and that is just a few kms away from your base, so supply is not an issue.
5) Multidirectional incursions stretch defenses thin in a kind of whack-a-mole game of sorts. For example, the Kobarid rout was a successful attack out of many launched simultaneously all over that front.
Here there have been multiple attacks in the Kherson direction, then to the north of Kharkov, and finally the successful push has been named from Balakleya, but really invested Volokiv Yar and pushed forward to Shevchenkovo and Kupiansk. Other attacks to the South led to Izyum. So the front didn't "'collapse' on it's own."
You are gratuitously implying I was not aware of that when you write "There may be more to the Ukie tactical manual than you are catching on to so far."
Regarding the token Ukrainian assaults, I would never have imagined this particular attack to be so wildly successful, as to entirely expel the Russians from Kharkov Oblast. Perhaps not even the Ukrainians were. I was hardly alone in my conviction: everyone thought the "Counteroffensive" was just a show off to look good and receive further weapon shipments from abroad.
«the rural folk in Ukraine would refer to themselves as “Rusyn” [...] Ethnic Russians meanwhile refer to themselves as Russkiy»
I think there are actually 3 (or 4) nowadays: a tiny "rusyn" minority in the Carpathians, the "ruthenians" in western Ukraine, the russian-speaking "ukrainians" in central Ukraine, and the russians (called "muscovites" or "kastaps" by the ruthenians) in east and south Ukraine. I think that both the central, eastern, south people used to refer to themselves as "russkiy" whatever their nationality.
All the troubles are created by the "ruthenians" who want to recreate the great Kingdom of Ruthenia or the lithuanian-ruthenian-polish empire (with them on top this time, not the poles).
So … do we think the AFU were being smart in Kharkov at the same time they were being foolish in Kherson? Or is the Kherson action intelligible as a feint or something?
Good question. I don't think Kherson was a diversion. I think Kherson was identified as an attractive point to test for other reasons. Namely that it is across the Dnieper.
Taking Kherson secures Odessa, liberates the Dniepr estuary, and opens a corridor to Crimea and another all the way to Mariupol
I wasn’t referring to the objective, but to the reports of the failure of the AFU push in that area, even as they made the big advance to near Kupyansk.
My misunderstanding: I thought you meant the Ukrainians conceived the Kherson attack as a feint, before the main one launched towards Kupiansk. I listed the reasons to think it may have been legit.
Well, just to be clear, I *was* suggesting that possibility: that rather than the failure it appears to be, the push in Kherson was a feint or diversion to help the real objective in Kharkov. But it was just a question and, as Marko says, probably not the case. Reality, especially in war, has no obligation to be neat and easy to grasp.
Does this mean Russian will be soon forced into using conscripts?
There was speculation Kremlin planned to annex Lugansk and Donetsk making it Russian soil which would allow it to use conscripts there without having to proclaim the state of war, but inability to take Donetsk put a wrench in that.
«Kremlin planned to annex Lugansk and Donetsk making it Russian soil which would allow it to use conscripts there without having to proclaim the state of war»
There is a bit of a myth that this is war from the Russian Federation against Ukraine, but it is actually a counter-attack by the DPR and LNR (helped by a small RF allied force) against the war of aggression started by the ukrainian government in 9 may 2014. The DPR and LNR already have conscription...
The late Romans had a system of mobile central reserves behind frontier lines which were held only by lightly armed garrisons. There was one such Reserve in Gallia Belgica, one in what we call now Burgundy, a beefy one watching the Danube near Sirmium the current Belgrade, others in modern Bulgaria, Syria and Jordan. These defence nuclei, mostly composed of cavalry, would fall upon any invader who managed to breach the frontier, once he's deep enough in friendly territory.
The Ukrainians don't seem serious enough to attack synchronously on multiple points of the front with aim of collapsing it. They only attempt token assaults to look good and get foreign funding. Hence perhaps the ancient Roman defensive stratagem would have benefited the Russians in their current predicament: one mobile reserve group in Kherson, another in Melitopol to watch the Southern front, then one in Belgorod and one in Kupiansk protecting the Karkhov front.
I don't think they would have to watch out for missile attacks aimed at these troop concentrations either, Ukrainians can't strike at long range anymore.
The Roman cavalry as an integrated part of it's total military was pretty much absent after the end of the Republic, and the 'equestrian' class became more of a social guild than a military force. The non-Roman 'auxiliary' horsemen were increasingly turned to; these fought well, under their own leaders, when properly integrated into the high commands battle strategies.
A modern analogy for purposes of your notion would be the Chechens, who have functioned as something of a de facto elite force in Ukraine. That's where your idea breaks down. The Mussies are a 'one off' for Rus. The doctrine of mobile reserves in the modern context requires the sort of 'mid-operational' level freedom of action which the (still standing)Soviet doctrine makes no allowance for. Where a "Guderian/Patton" type of field commander could liaison with his personal and adjoining commands with freedom to exploit opportunities or defend deteriorating sections, the Russian field commander has no such initiative.
Moving(scarce)reserves into battle without a well-coordinated horizontal command structure, especially when it requires long distance movements without a lot of cover, is a good recipe for disaster. I guess the Kyiv debacle would have have taught a Russian high command that practical lesson, had there been any interest in learning and adapting to field conditions - instead of simply rinse n repeat boondoggles which have created the very opportunity UA is seeking to exploit in the east.
Horses eat grass, and grains when working. They move well in small or large groupings and if well cared for by their rider, can(could) travel faster through forbidding territory than the modern petro-monsters can, and don't depend upon rear echelon supply lines as a matter of life or death.
Somebody should have called and told the Russian Army that Ukraine ain't Syria, and that it's time to write up a new doctrine. A lot of dead Russkie paras would still be walking around today, if the message had got through.
A front can 'collapse' on it's own. There may be more to the Ukie tactical manual than you are catching on to so far.
I will gloss over the arrogant and dismissive tone of your message and answer in the merit:
1) I have specified late Romans, never mentioned the Republic or the Equestres for that matter, who originally were the citizens that could afford a horse and connected panoply of arms, then the meaning of the word shifted to indicate the well-heeled.
Contrary to what you wrote, the Roman cavalry had been an increasingly important component of the legions since the crisis of the 3rd century. This is due to the influence of the clashes with the revamped Persian Sasanid Empire to the East, which began at that time to field heavy cavalry (Cataphractes).
With the reforms of Diocletian the new Comitatenses (later Palatini) system was put in place, in which cavalry de facto was increasingly important, Roman or Foederata I didn't specify. This is reflected in the increasing importance of the rank of Magister Equitus at the imperial court. From the most readily source you can access to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comitatenses :
"In the Late Roman Empire the army was divided into two units, the Limitanei and the Comitatenses. The Limitanei would defend against an invasion long enough for the Comitatenses legions to arrive. These Comitatenses legions would be grouped into field armies.[2] This strategy has been described as "defense in depth." "
The above is exactly what I described. The military organisation of the Empire devolved into an increasingly localised one, where the leader or Comes would also be the local landowner who would be invested with the onus of local defense by Rome. With the fall of the Empire, these "Comes" landowners would transition to become the Frankish Counts.
As an aside, the Eastern Roman Empire was even more decisively leaning towards cavalry-dominated armies: the Bucellarii, veterans of Belisarius' campaigns in Spain, Italy, Africa, Mesopotamia were in fact Cataphractes he personally financed (curiously many were Huns).
Again, and I cite it because I find it very interesting, from wikipedia: "Coulston notes that the bucellarii provided the best cavalry in 5th and 6th century Roman armies, and were "recruited from Romans, Persians, Goths, and Huns, amongst others". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucellarii
Essentially, I have read these guys could provide both light and heavy cavalry services. Traditionalist writers from the court of Constantinople in the VI century lamented the decay with respect to the classical era, to whom 'modernists' replied exalting how exceptionally trained these Bucellarii were, with respect to the basic Roman legionary of old. It is reported that Romans amongst Bucellarii ranks could shoot arrows from the saddle exactly like Huns.
2) I didn't equate "Mobile Reserve" with "Elite Corps". Even if I did, it seems to me that a recurrent theme in the current campaign is that every Russian breakthrough (Popasnaya, Pesky) had the Wagner Group involved. I don't know about the Chechens, but I get the impression they are more fizzle than steak.
For the rest, yes, it is notorious the Soviets had a more centralised command, mostly for political reasons though. But then there is the difference between what's written on manuals and the actual practice on the field, and the very existence of this difference is probably what Americans tend not to be able to grasp. Common sense dictates upper brass cannot painstakingly micromanage every little movement of each single company.
On paper they say they do, because that's what's required for them to save appearances.
On the field, where things matter, minute tactical decisions to be made real time are devolved to the highest rank that has on-hands awareness of the current situation his unit is dealing with.
Thinking that the Russians can't grasp what they have put in practice since the battle of Poltava, but instead believing them to be just dull morons who stand still and wait for orders while under enemy fire, means to naively disparaging them.
You undoubtedly were told Communist doctrine was so stiff and antiquate, while the American system is so supple and advanced.
Yet on the field of battle, America was brought from the brink of defeat to a fortuitous stalemate in the Korean War against a bunch of medieval communist peasants, and later had to admit defeat in Vietnam against a similar opponents. Guess who had military aides involved with the Communist sides? The Soviets!
TLDR, in war: U.S.A. - Communists 0-0 0-1, Communists advance to the next round
Wow! Yu r in OVERDRIVE!
tdlr? I only see that on the blogs with all the DEATH TO AMERIKA Pootie jock sniffers whose readership loves to talk in code cause it makes em feel more 'cool' man. Thanks for 'comin out!'
I'd written to you basing it on the agreed subject of ''late Roman" and keeping way from the more troublesome topic of your errant "police action." But I can see you are ALREADY melting down in the classic "hedge" manner. No need to proceed.
"Frantic" indeed.
best o luck!
Yes, the very premise in Internet exchanges, that we all ought to communicate in the framework of American mentality, mildly irritates me.
It's not only the language, but also the style, the morality, the very crassness of replying with arrogance to a complete stranger who was merely sharing a thought on a comment section, the concept that one does not have to answer back because otherwise he'll be told he has been "triggered" and that is supposedly humiliating, etc.
Mostly I manage to keep it in the background, but this irritation can burst to surface in special cases such as your intervention.
What did I do to make you write me back in that tone?... did I maybe sort of intruded into someone else's territory with my parallel to late Roman tactics?
I sincerely hope it was my fault, and not the average way you interact on message boards instead.
You need a mirror badly friend. And a defogger for it as well. The very idea that you imagine this exchange took place in 'the framework of an American mentality' is riotous. But you'll never know.
I got that you are 'irritated.' I used to come up against that vast army of 'irritated' westerners on those outlets pretending that to be opposed to "Anglo-American Imperialism meant taking all one's talking points from "Greater Russia" imperialist outlets. It was boring. They couldn't 'hear' outside their safe space. So I stopped.
The intensity of your discomfort is boring as well. So I will stop here too.
sincere best wishes.
Fair enough
3) Moving a few mechanised regiments (or BTGs as they say now) out of a reserve division stationed in Kupiansk to Balakleya is not a huge logistical undertaking, just an hour drive.
With "A well-coordinated horizontal command structure" I guess you mean the act of telling professional soldiers and tank commanders "Go there, repel the attack and keep us informed of the developments so we can assist with artillery and airforce, while coordinating your efforts with those of other land units. If you communicate with us, we can also plan further defense, a retreat or even a counter-attack depending on how the battle goes real time".
Again, your premises: "Russian regulations are rigidly top-down", (the hidden one) "we Americans are too robotic to deviate from regulations",
hence your conclusions: "Russian units are unresponsive on the field, Russian strategists are so incompetent they cannot conceive the flexibility their ancestors have exhibited throughout history, hence Russians are morons".
Belgorod, Kupiansk, Melitopol, Kherson as I laid out, get all the secondary fronts covered by a mobile reserve defense.
Also, the initial Kiev offensive is not a pertinent comparison. That was attacking, here we are talking defense which means operating inside an area you control and have logistics already in place, while the attacker has none.
4) Horses ARE severely hampered while travelling through "forbidden territory", meaning mountains or marshes.
Anyway I don't see the point of criticising a mobile reserve defense approach from the logistics angle. Yes, tanks guzzle up a lot of fuel, but we are talking the eventuality of defense of an area Russians are in control of, have air superiority over, and that is just a few kms away from your base, so supply is not an issue.
5) Multidirectional incursions stretch defenses thin in a kind of whack-a-mole game of sorts. For example, the Kobarid rout was a successful attack out of many launched simultaneously all over that front.
Here there have been multiple attacks in the Kherson direction, then to the north of Kharkov, and finally the successful push has been named from Balakleya, but really invested Volokiv Yar and pushed forward to Shevchenkovo and Kupiansk. Other attacks to the South led to Izyum. So the front didn't "'collapse' on it's own."
You are gratuitously implying I was not aware of that when you write "There may be more to the Ukie tactical manual than you are catching on to so far."
Regarding the token Ukrainian assaults, I would never have imagined this particular attack to be so wildly successful, as to entirely expel the Russians from Kharkov Oblast. Perhaps not even the Ukrainians were. I was hardly alone in my conviction: everyone thought the "Counteroffensive" was just a show off to look good and receive further weapon shipments from abroad.
«the rural folk in Ukraine would refer to themselves as “Rusyn” [...] Ethnic Russians meanwhile refer to themselves as Russkiy»
I think there are actually 3 (or 4) nowadays: a tiny "rusyn" minority in the Carpathians, the "ruthenians" in western Ukraine, the russian-speaking "ukrainians" in central Ukraine, and the russians (called "muscovites" or "kastaps" by the ruthenians) in east and south Ukraine. I think that both the central, eastern, south people used to refer to themselves as "russkiy" whatever their nationality.
All the troubles are created by the "ruthenians" who want to recreate the great Kingdom of Ruthenia or the lithuanian-ruthenian-polish empire (with them on top this time, not the poles).